This article proposes a typology of causal mechanisms whereby transnational relations of recognition constitute conflict actors in frozen conflicts. While the agency of an emerging conflict actor manifests itself in 'struggles for recognition' motivated by experiences of 'disrespect', responses from different significant others vary in terms of motivations and pathways (mechanisms of recognition). Adapting Honneth's tripartite division, the typology distinguishes between four forms of recognition; thin cognitive recognition, 'respect'/rights, 'esteem'/difference and 'love'/empathy. Three transnational corrections are made in order to include transnational relations of recognition, non-state actors and unstructured social-relational forms of international/transnational recognition. The typology is applied to the conflict of Western Sahara, which has been reshaped by the rise of internal Sahrawi pro-independence groups (based inside the territory annexed by Morocco) as an increasingly relevant conflict actor, with their identity shifting from victims to human rights activists to activists involved in an unsolved conflict. This identity and social-status formation has been the product of transnational recognition from three significant others, i.e. the annexing state (Morocco), the contested state-inexile (SADR) and the international community. The overall effect of intermingling recognition processes, including various instrumental initiatives deprived of mutuality, has been increased struggle and conflict complexity rather than 'recognitional peace'.
Introduction
'Frozen conflict' is often more of an enticing metaphor than a streamlined analytical concept. Frozen conflicts have been defined as conflict situations where 'the violence stopped, but the underlying interests of the formerly warring parties have neither been abated nor addressed'.
1 'Contested states' 2 with limited international recognition but unwilling to relinquish their sovereignty aspirations are frequently part of the stalemate equation. Yet, the pressing of the pause button implied by the adjective 'frozen' raises eyebrows. If there is any consensus in the meagre scholarship on this topic, it is that frozen conflicts are seldom such. Smetana and Ludvík distinguish between three types of dynamics: peaceful thawing, violent thawing and conflict withering. Among the causes of these changes, they tentatively point to third party involvement, including that of the contested state's 'patron state', the practices of the 'international conflict resolution apparatus' and the shifting interests of various domestic actors. 3 The list is not meant to be exhaustive and leaves out significant yet understudied internal dynamics, 4 including bottom-up alterations in the inner player/party structure of a frozen conflict that may be driven by the emergence of a new conflict actor. Such is the focus of this article, where I will argue that, in these dynamics, 'what counts as a relevant actor, and how these actors acquire their status or standing' 5 is essentially a product of recognition.
Defined as the intersubjective relation required for the 'formation of the practical self' 6 and, by extension, 'a social act' whereby 'another actor […] is constituted as a subject with a legitimate social standing', 7 recognition presupposes a dynamic interaction between the agency, or 'struggle', of a given actor and responses from one or various 'significant others'. The former's identity formation and social status inherently depend on the latter's feedback. Then, how can the workings of recognition constitute actorness and thereby become a force for change within the context of a frozen conflict? What are the causal mechanisms involved on both sides of the developing self-other relationship(s) and how do they play out?
The conflict over Western Sahara in northwest Africa pitting Morocco against the proindependence Polisario Front -plus its conjoined contested state-in-exile, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) -is one of those stuck in the kind of protracted 'no war, no peace' situation described by the frozen conflict literature. Large-scale violence or open warfare has been absent for nearly three decades, and thus it no longer qualifies as a war or armed conflict in databases such as the UCDP/PRIO one or Correlates of War.
However, no proper peace settlement has yet been reached, and 'the basic incompatibility between the parties -the status of the territory of Western Sahara -remains unresolved'. 8 Western Sahara therefore helps us to envisage a universal, not-region-specific definition of frozen conflict, stripped of the post-Soviet bias with which the concept originally became associated in the 1990s. Furthermore, this is a particularly intriguing case for addressing the problem of change in frozen conflicts. Over the last two decades, while identity', 11 recognition theory provides a distinct angle for examining the transnational dimension of conflicts 12 in primarily social terms, looking at the role of non-material factors whose causal operation cannot be reduced to rational choice. The explanatory lens of causal mechanisms places the attention on 'the pathways or processes by which an effect is produced or a purpose is accomplished'. 13 This has been advocated as an avenue for cumulative middle-range theoretical progress in International Relations (IR), typically in the form of causal mechanism typologies.
14 In this respect, the two-sided nature of recognition relations implies the operation of two causal mechanisms in parallel. On one hand, the agency of the emerging conflict actor manifests itself in a series of 'struggles for recognition'. According to Honneth's theory, the causal mechanism at work here is quite straightforward and universal. It is always the painful experience of denial of recognition or 'disrespect' that motivates a subject to engage in this sort of moral struggle, 'for it is only by regaining the possibility of active conduct that individuals can dispel the state of emotional tension into which they are forced as a result of humiliation'. 15 What is less homogeneous are the motivations and pathways for significant others to respond to the new actor's struggle in one way or another. This is what the typology in this article seeks to capture as 'mechanisms of recognition'. The remainder of the article proceeds in four steps. First, a review is made of the journey of recognition theory from Hegelian philosophy through critical theory to IR and peacebuilding, identifying also the biases and blind spots of each of these strands. Second, building on Honneth's tripartite division of forms of recognition ('love', 'respect', 'esteem'), 16 the theoretical foundations are laid for a typology of causal mechanisms of transnational recognition involved in the constitution of conflict actors in frozen conflicts.
This requires examining the challenges of empirically operationalising and adapting
Honneth's 'social theory with normative content', as well as making three transnational corrections with the aim of including transnational relations of recognition, recognition struggles of non-state actors, and unstructured social and relational forms of international/transnational recognition. Third, the effects of frozen conflict on transnational recognition dynamics are considered with specific reference to the case of Western Sahara. Finally, inductive insights from this case study are incorporated in order to substantiate the typology of mechanisms of recognition, which combines the two dimensions along which responses to the internal Sahrawi nationalists' struggles may vary, i.e. significant others and forms of recognition.
The journey of recognition from philosophy to IR and peacebuilding
'Everyone cares about recognition'. 17 Recognition theory as we know it today emerged in the 1990s in an attempt to underscore how pervasive and constitutive relations of recognition are throughout social and political life. The shared philosophical ancestor for all of its proponents was Hegel, the author of the concept of the 'struggle for recognition'. comprehensive 'social theory with normative content' based on the premise that there is one underlying 'moral grammar' that is common to all social struggles. According to Honneth, the three components of any individual's self-determination are selfconfidence, self-respect and self-esteem, which in turn rely on the social recognition provided by others in the form of 'love', 'rights' and 'solidarity', respectively. The disrespect experienced when any of these is denied triggers struggles for recognition which act as a 'productive force for change'. 23 On the other hand, an Anglo-American strand led by Taylor 24 developed the notion of the 'politics of recognition' in relation to multiculturalism and the politics of identity, as a critique of universalistic rights-based approaches to these issues. This latter strand became a lively breeding ground for scholarship on the struggles of all kinds of subaltern social groups and minorities suffering from misrecognition, the so-called 'new social movements' and the 'politics of difference'.
The critical theory and 'politics of recognition' approaches share a number of common traits. First, in terms of level of analysis, they both extrapolate the Hegelian mechanisms of recognition from the (inter)personal psychological domain by assigning collective agency -the capability to be subject and object of recognition -to larger social groups.
Honneth particularly stresses the 'I in we', or 'recognition as a driving force of group formation'. 25 For him, the transposition of (mis)recognition from the individual to the collective level works as a 'practical process in which individual experiences of disrespect are read as typical for an entire group, and in such a way that they can motivate collective demands for expanded relations of recognition'. 26 Second, the two approaches similarly embrace the 'recognition deficit' model 27 in warning of the damaging effects of the lack of recognition or disrespect, and assuming that more recognition would be the logical 
Recognition dynamics in frozen conflicts and the case of Western Sahara
Now, besides the range of actors involved, the context of frozen conflict itself has some specific effects on transnational recognition dynamics, as this section endeavours to show with reference to the case of Western Sahara. First, although the basic incompatibility between the parties remains unresolved, the absence of large-scale violence allows for a to emerge. These would turn out to be the most significant frozen conflict dynamic in subsequent years, as the implementation of the self-determination referendum for the Additional data about the significant others' motivations stem from my previous research The typology in Table 1 classifies mechanisms of recognition, i.e. the pathways or processes whereby responses to the internal Sahrawi nationalists' struggles are produced, by combining the two dimensions -forms of recognition and significant others. Although the range of potential significant others in a frozen conflict context is wider (see above), the list here is limited to those that play a most relevant role in this particular case.
Similarly, causal mechanisms are identified on an inductive, case-specific basis, and do not purport to be exhaustive. In fact, the 2005 'intifada' was more important for the internal Sahrawi groups' struggles for recognition vis-à-vis their other two significant others. Media coverage was also the causal mechanism that enabled the internal Sahrawi nationalists to be noticed as conflict actors by the international community. By this point, rather than mass media, it was the internet that became instrumental for the global dissemination of images of the brutal Moroccan crackdown against Sahrawi demonstrators. They took them themselves with digital cameras or mobile phones, and thus framed in their own, often nationalist, terms.
The most impactful move in this regard was the smuggling of a small camera into the 
Recognition as 'respect'/equal rights from the international community through official engagement on the ground
When it comes to the third significant other, the international community, the principal causal mechanism of recognition as 'respect' or equal rights for the Sahrawi population of the Moroccan-annexed Western Sahara in general, and internal Sahrawi proindependence groups in particular, has been official presence and engagement on the ground from both foreign states and international organisations. This has not supposed a straightforward expansion of rights in the legal-institutional sense, given the absence of international governance mechanisms at the local level, but has countered the inclination towards neglect and unequal treatment that has characterised the international management of the Western Sahara conflict. formation of the 'we'. Also, compared to the Western societies considered by Honneth, 'esteem' in this context faced the essential hindrance posed by the absence of a democratic public sphere and process of will-formation. 132 As regards causal mechanisms, the main pathway for this type of recognition was a combination of institution-building and co-optation of Sahrawi elite individuals. Most importantly, these measures did not respond to a distinct Sahrawi struggle and were therefore largely one- 
Conclusions and broader research agenda
This article has argued that frozen conflicts frequently change, and that recognition is a fundamental driving force in some of their bottom-up relational dynamics. This is supports the argument that real-world recognition dynamics produce dual and contingent effects. Due to the multiple, cross-cutting identities that exist in the socio-political world, 'processes of recognition are fractious and unstable, characterised by aggression and selfassertion, as well as affection and the creation of a "we-feeling"'. 143 In particular, partial and one-sided recognition initiatives driven by instrumental rationality and far removed from the ideal of mutuality tend to widen self vs. other differences, 144 
